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Abstract
We show that it is NP-Complete to decide whether a bimatrix game is degenerate and it is
Co-NP-Complete to decide whether a bimatrix game is nondegenerate.
1 Introduction
Game theory is a subject to study and predict behaviors of rational decision makers. Nash [1] in
1950 showed that under mild conditions, a noncooperative game always has a Nash equilibrium.
However, Nash’s proof of the existence of Nash equilibrium is nonconstructive. People have devoted
to studying the computation of Nash equilibria since then. On the complexity side, it has been
shown that it is PPAD-complete to compute a Nash equilibrium, even for bimatrix games [6, 5]. On
the algorithmic side, a nice property about bimatrix games is that as long as the payoff matrices
are rational, the equilibria must be rational, too. Lemke and Howson [3] designed a combinatorial
algorithm that can not only compute equilibria of a bimatrix game but also prove the existence
of equilibria constructively. Nevertheless, just like the Simplex algorithm for linear programming,
Lemke and Howson’s algorithm can fail on degenerate games. As linear programming, degeneracy
in games can be solved by perturbation techniques [2].
In this paper, we will investigate the computational complexity of deciding degeneracy in bimatrix
games. We will show that it is NP-Complete to decide whether a bimatrix game is degenerate while
it is Co-NP-Complete to decide whether it is nondegenerate.
2 Preliminaries
2.1 Definitions
Bimatrix games are the simplest cases of normal form games. In a bimatrix game, there are two
players called the row player and the column player with pure strategy spaces R and C respectively.
We can use two matrices A and B to represent the payoff matrices to the row player and the column
player when they play different combinations of pure strategies. Specifically, Aij is the payoff to the
row player when he plays its ith pure strategy while the column players plays its jth pure strategy.
A mixed strategy is a probability distribution on the strategy space. Let ∆m and ∆n be the mixed
strategy spaces of the row and the column player.
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Definition 1. (Nash equilibrium) Given the payoff matrices (A,B) of the row and column players,
a strategy profile (x∗, y∗) is a Nash equilibrium iff ∀x ∈ ∆m, (x
∗)TAy∗ ≥ xTAy∗ and ∀y ∈ ∆n,
(x∗)TBy∗ ≥ (x∗)TBy.
A closely related concept to Nash equilibrium is best response condition.
Definition 2. [2] (Best Response condition) Let x and y be the strategies for the row and column
player respectively. x is the best response to y iff
xi > 0⇒ (Ay)i = u = max{(Ay)k|k ∈M}
Now are ready to define degeneracy in games.
Definition 3. [2] (Nondegenerate) A bimatrix game is nondenegerate if there is no mixed strategy
of size k has more than k pure best responses.
Otherwise, if the above condition is violated, the game is called degenerate.
2.2 Degeneracy in Linear Programming and in Bimatrix Games
In a linear system, {
Ax = b
x ≥ 0
where A is a matrix of dimension m×n and rank m. This system is said to be degenerate, if there
exists a basis B such that at least one component in the vector B−1b is zero. In the next, we will
study the relationship between degeneracy in linear programming and bimatrix games. If the linear
system is degenerate, b can be expressed as a linear combination of at most m − 1 columns of A.
It is [4] shown that deciding whether a linear programming is degenerate is NP-Complete.
We want to discuss the relationship between degeneracy in linear programming and degeneracy
in games. Let A =
(
1 2
0 1
)
and b = (2, 1)T . It is easy to see that this linear system is degenerate.
However, if A is the payoff matrix of the row (the column) players, the game is nondegenerate.
Reversely, A =
(
1 1
0 1
)
and b = (2, 1)T . If A is the payoff matrix in a bimatrix game, the
game is degenerate. However, the linear system is nondegenerate. Therefore, degeneracy in linear
programming does not imply degeneracy in games; vice versa.
3 The Main Theorem
Theorem 1. It is NP-complete to decide whether a bimatrix game is degenerate.
The construction: We will reduce the 3-SAT to our problem. Let f be a 3-SAT formula f =
c1 ∧ c2 ∧ ...∧ cn, where each clause ci = li1 ∨ li2 ∨ li3 contains three literals. Each literal liw is either
a positive variable xh or its negation xh. Let c
k
i denote the assignment of the true values of the
three literals in ci as the binary representation of the integer k, where k ∈ [1..7]. For example, the
binary representation of 5 is 101. Thus, c5i represents the assignment such that li1 = 1, li2 = 0 and
li3 = 1.
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The strategy space of the column player is C = {cki |i ∈ [1..n] and k ∈ [1..7]}. And the strategy
space R of the row player is C
⋃
{f}
⋃
{cpi c
q
j | c
p
i and c
q
j are conflicting}, where f is a special strategy.
Two clauses assignments cpi and c
q
j are conflicting iff there are two literals liw in ci and ljs in cj
that are corresponding to the same variable xh and c
p
i and c
q
j make conflicting assignments to xh.
For example, let c1 = x1 ∨ x2 ∨x3 and c2 = x2 ∨ x4 ∨ x5. c
5
1 will make x2 = 0, which assigns x2 = 1
and c32 will assign x2 = 0. Thus, c
5
1 and c
3
2 are conflicting clauses assignments. Note that the order
of cpi and c
q
j does not matter, i.e., the pure strategy c
p
i c
q
j implicitly equals the pure strategy c
q
jc
p
i .
Given the strategy space of the row and column players, the payoff function r for the row player
is
1. r(cpi , c
k
h) = 1 if i = h and p = k; otherwise r(c
p
i , c
k
h) = 0.
2. ∀h ∈ [1..n] and k ∈ [1..7], r(f, ckh) = 1/n.
3. Suppose we have D conflicting clauses assignments cpi c
q
j and let g be an ordering of the
elements in {cpi c
q
j | c
p
i and c
q
j are conflicting}. Thus, for the dth conflicting clauses assignments
cpi c
q
j , r(c
p
i c
q
j , c
k
h) =
1
2 + 3
dǫ if i = h and p = k or j = h and q = k; otherwise r(cpi c
q
j , c
k
h) = 0.
Here ǫ is a small positive number whose values will be fixed later. Note that D ∈ θ(n2).
The following matrix illustrates the payoff function of the row player.
c11 c
2
1 ... c
7
1 c
1
2 c
2
2 ... c
7
2 ......... c
1
n c
2
n ... c
7
n
c11 1
c21 1
. .
.
c71 1
c12 1
. .
. .
c72 1
. .
.
c1n 1
. .
. .
c7n 1
f 1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
1
n
c11c
2
1
1
2
+ ǫ 1
2
+ ǫ
.
.
c
p
i c
q
j
1
2
+ 3
dǫ 1
2
+ 3
dǫ
.
.
c6nc
7
n
1
2
+ 3
D−1ǫ 1
2
+ 3
D−1
Proof. Given the mixed strategy y of the column player with support k, we can multiply y with the
payoff matrix of the row player. Then, if the number of best responses of the row player is more
than k, the game is degenerate. Thus, deciding degeneracy is in NP. We will reduce the 3-SAT
problem to the problem of deciding degeneracy in games as shown in above. It is obvious that the
size of the payoff matrix is in a polynomial of n and each entry of the matrix can be represented
by a polynomial number of bits. Therefore, the construction can be done in polynomial time.
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If there is a satisfying assignment to the variables of the formula f , the assignment of each clause
cki must be in the form of c
k
i , where k ∈ [1..7]. We call such a corresponding strategy c
k
i active
pure strategy. We will set the mixed strategy y of the column player to be 1
n
on those active pure
strategies and 0 at any other pure strategies. Thus, the support or y is n. Given such a y, it is
easy to see, for the row player, all the active pure strategies and f are the best responses to y, i.e.,
the number of best responses is n+ 1. Therefore, if f is satisfiable, the game is degenerate.
In the next, we prove the reverse direction. Suppose the game is degenerate. Again let y the
strategy of the column player, u be the maximum payoff to the row player given y and S be the
support set of y. Assume that the support set S can be represented as the union of two subsets
M = {cki |y[c
k
i ] = u} and N = {c
k
i |y[c
k
i ] < u}. We will show that the set N is empty in the next.
Given y, we will count the number of best responses of the row players respect to y. First of all,
for strategy cki ∈ M, its corresponding pure strategy for the row player is one of the best responses.
Secondly, the payoff to the strategy f is 1
n
. For any pure strategy cpi c
q
j , if both c
p
i ∈ M and c
q
j ∈ M,
its payoff will exceed u, which contradicts the maximum payoff assumption of u. Thus, at most
one of cpi and c
q
j can belong to N . Now assume that c
p1
i1
∈ N and the corresponding pure strategy
cp1i1 c
q1
j1
of the row player is one of the best responses, while cq2j2 ∈ N and the corresponding pure
strategy cp2i2 c
q2
j2
of the row player is also one of the best responses. Moreover, assume that cp1i1 c
q1
j1
is at the d1th row of the payoff matrix, c
p2
i2
cq2j2 is at the d2th row and c
p1
i1
cq2j2 is the dth row, where
d1 < d2 < d. Thus, we claim that the payoff to c
p1
i1
cq2j2 will be more than u when ǫ is small enough.
Note that, by the assumption of best response condition,
(
1
2
+ 3d1ǫ)(y[cp1i1 ] + y[c
q1
j1
]) = u
, we know that y[cq1j1 ] ≤ u, thus y[c
p1
i1
] ≥ 1−2∗3
d1 ǫ
1+2∗3d1 ǫ
u. Similarly, we can get y[cq2j2 ] ≥
1−2∗3d2 ǫ
1+2∗3d2 ǫ
u. Set
ǫ = 1
6∗32D
, the payoff to cp1i1 c
q2
j2
would be
(
1
2
+ 3dǫ)(
1− 2 ∗ 3d1ǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3d1ǫ
+
1− 2 ∗ 3d2ǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3d2ǫ
)u > (1 + 2 ∗ 3dǫ)
1− 2 ∗ 3d2ǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3d2ǫ
u
≥ (1 + 6 ∗ 3d2ǫ)
1− 2 ∗ 3d2ǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3d2ǫ
u
=
1 + 4 ∗ 3d2−2D − 12 ∗ 32(d2−2D)
1 + 2 ∗ 3d2−2D
u
> u
Thus, for any pure strategy cpi c
q
j , if it is one of the best responses respect to y, either c
p
i or c
q
j will
be in N and it can not appear in any best response pure strategy cp
′
i′
cq
′
j′
, which has smaller order
than cpi c
q
j . In other words, each best response pure strategy c
p
i c
q
j must consume one element in N ,
which is not shared with other best response conflicting clauses strategies.
Now, we can count the number of best responses respect to y. First of all, we know that
u ≥ 1
n
, since the payoff to the strategy f is always 1
n
. If u > 1
n
, the number of best responses is
|M|+ |N | = |S|. Thus, the game is nondegenerate. If u = 1
n
, let n′ be the number of best responses
conflicting clauses strategies. We will show that n′ < |N |. Otherwise, assume n′ = |N |. (n′ can
not be greater than |N | since each best response pure strategy cpi c
q
j must consume one nonshared
element in N ). Since for each best response conflicting clause strategy cpi c
q
j , either c
p
i or c
q
j will be
in N . W.L.O.G., we assume cpi ∈ N . We also know that
1−2∗3Dǫ
1+2∗3Dǫ
1
n
≤ y[cpi ] <
1
n
. Thus, there must
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be a strategy cki ∈ N such that
0 < y[cki ] ≤ 1−
|M|
n
−
1− 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
|N | − 1
n
≤
|M|+ |N | − 1
n
−
|M|
n
−
1− 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
|N | − 1
n
≤
|N | − 1
n
4 ∗ 3Dǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
we know that when ǫ = 1
6∗32D
,
|N | − 1
n
4 ∗ 3Dǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
<
1− 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
1 + 2 ∗ 3Dǫ
1
n
It implies that the strategy cki can not appear in any best response conflicting clause strategy.
Thus n′ < |N |. Moreover, f is one of the best response when u = 1
n
. In all, when u = 1
n
, the
number of the best responses for the row player respect to y can not be more than |N | + |M|.
Thus the game in nondegenerate. Since we assume that the game is degenerate, contradiction
occurs. Therefore, N is empty. Equivalently, we know that S =M. We further claim that u = 1
n
.
Otherwise, if u > 1
n
, f can not be one of the best responses and any conflicting clauses strategy can
not be either. The game is still degenerate. Thus, u = 1
n
. Moreover, we know that for any cpi and
cqi , both y[c
p
i ] and y[c
q
i ] can equal to
1
n
simultaneously. Otherwise, the payoff to conflicting clauses
strategy cpi c
q
i is more than
1
n
. Reversely, for every clauses ci, there must be a k such that c
k
i ∈ S
by the pigeon hole principle. Thus, each clause is satisfied. Similarly, no two conflicting clauses
cpi and c
q
j can be in the support set S of y. Therefore, the clauses assignment (c
k1
1 , c
k2
2 , ..., c
kn
n )
corresponding to S gives a satisfying assignment to the formula f .
Finally, we have shown that the formula f is satisfiable iff the game is degenerate. Thus, deciding
degeneracy is NP-Complete. ⊓⊔
A straightforward corollary of Theorem 1 is that,
Corollary 1. It is Co-NP-Complete to decide whether a game is nondegenerate.
In the next, we want to study a special class of bimatrix games: win-lose games. In win-lose
bimatrix games, the payoff value is either 0 or 1. The following is the necessary and sufficient
condition for a win-lose bimatrix game to be nondegenerate.
Theorem 2. For a win-lose bimatrix game, it is nondegenerate iff for the row player, every column
of its payoff matrix A has at most 1 nonzero element while for the column player, every row of its
payoff matrix B has at most 1 nonzero element, too.
Proof. We prove our claim only for the row player and the proof for the column player follows
symmetrically. Suppose a win-lose game is nondegenerate, each column of matrix A can not have
more than 1 nonzero item. Otherwise, if the column player plays a pure strategy of that column,
the row player has more than 1 best responses. Thus, the game is degenerate. Contradiction occurs.
On the other hand, if each column of matrix A has at most 1 nonzero element, for each strategy y
of the column player, the number of nonzero elements in the vector Ay can not be more than the
size of support in y. Thus, the game is nondegenerate. ⊓⊔
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4 Conclusion and Future Works
In this paper, we show that it is NP-Complete to decide whether a bimatrix game is degenerate
while it is Co-NP-Complete to decide whether it is nondegenerate. Although degeneracy in bimatrix
games as well as in linear programming can be solved by perturbation techniques. It is unclear that
how the perturbations affect the computational efficiency of the Lemke-Howson algorithm. It is
worthwhile to further investigate the impact of degeneracy in the computation of Nash equilibria.
Moreover, the design of PTAS for Nash equilbria is widely open. In all, we believe that the study
of computations of Nash equilibria is a challenging and interesting area.
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